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Article 13

THE INSURER'S DEFENSE OBLIGATION: WHEN
DOES IT INCLUDE A DUTY TO APPEAL?
I. Introduction
It has been stated many times that the duty to defend its insured, an obligation which is imposed upon insurance companies in most liability insurance
contracts, does not necessarily encompass a further duty to appeal adverse decisions rendered against the insured; 2 nevertheless there are circumstances when
courts will require an insurance company to appeal on behalf of its insured in
order to fulfill its contractual obligation to provide an adequate defense. In the
past most of the decisions finding a duty to appeal have relied on a good-faith
versus bad-faith analysis of the insurance company's action; and, upon finding bad
faith in the failure to appeal, have declared a breach of contract by the company.
A few recent decisions have attempted to go beyond this limited analysis and
have more readily placed upon the insurance company a duty to appeal. This
note will focus upon these recent cases and attempt to examine how they may
affect the already troublesome area of the insurer's defense obligation.
The question of whether an insurance company has a duty to appeal only
becomes important when the trial court has rendered a judgment against the
insured which is in excess of the policy limits. Obviously, the insured would be
satisfied to allow a judgment within policy limits to stand since the insurer must
bear the entire burden of the judgment. The possibility of a duty to appeal,
however, does not arise only after an excessive judgment has been rendered. As
soon as plaintiff's complaint is drawn it is apparent whether the insured could
be liable for damages exceeding the policy limits. The most recent case in this
area, Ursprung v. Safeco Insurance Company of America,3 is illustrative of the
fact situation in which this question arises and of the new approach courts have
been taking.
The original action which gave rise to the duty to appeal question in
Ursprunginvolved an automobile accident between Sherry Ann Clark, who was
insured by Safeco, and James Ursprung, a motorcyclist. Ursprung had originally
sued Clark for $182,500 but her coverage with Safeco amounted only to $10,000.
Since there was such a great divergence between the policy limits and the amount
claimed as damages, Safeco advised Clark that she might retain additional
counsel although they would defend her at the trial in any event. Upon the
advice of a lawyer-friend Clark declined to retain personal counsel. Despite the
fact that they met several times before the trial, there was no offer to settle by
either the insurer's attorneys or Ursprung's attorneys, and judgment was rendered
1 This article is concerned with the situation which develops when the insurer admits
liability under the policy and defends on the trial court level, but then refuses to appeal on
behalf of its insured. The problem of imposing a duty to defend on the insurer when it denies
liability coverage will not be discussed. For a general view of this area see 7A J. APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682 (1962) and R. KEETON, BxsIc TEXT ON INSURANCE
LAw § 7.6 (1971).
2 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4688 (1962); 44 Am. JUR. 2d
Insurance § 1537 '(1969).
3 497 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1973).
1116

[Vol. 49:1116]

NOTES

in favor of Ursprung for $22,969.30. The insurer chose to pay its $10,000 liability rather than appeal and advised Clark of its decision. The insurer's attorneys felt that Clark had a good chance of establishing a defense of contributory
negligence as a matter of law on appeal, but Safeco nevertheless wanted to withdraw. In spite of this, Clark, on advice from her lawyer-friend, made no demand
that Safeco appeal, refused to accept a post-trial settlement offer from Ursprung
for $15,000, and refused to appeal on her own. Instead she assigned to Ursprung,
in satisfaction of the judgment in excess of the policy limits, her claim against
Safeco for failure to settle the claim in good faith and for failure to appeal.
This resulted in an action by Ursprung to recover the $12,969.30 differential
between his original judgment and the policy limits which were already paid
to him. The question was whether Safeco's actions in handling Clark's defense
were such that she could have held them liable for the excess judgment had she
not assigned her claim to Ursprung. Although the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
ruled in favor of Safeco, its reasoning established a most important precedent.
The court immediately dismissed the failure to settle issue by relying on the
trial court's determination that there was no bad faith involved,' but it found a
duty to appeal (a duty from which the insurer was released because Clark's
lawyer-friend had informed the insurer that other methods for her protection had
been arranged).' In order to establish this duty the court rejected the idea that
an insurer could pay its policy limits to the court or to the insured and thus
negate its defense duty. Instead it found that the agreement to indemnify was
separate from the agreement to defend. Despite payment, an insurer must continue in good faith to defend the insured and a complete defense includes proper
appeals.' In addition it found the bad-faith standard for determining an insurer's
liability for failure to take an appeal to be insufficient. Despite this being a case
of first impression in Kentucky, the court chose to follow a series of New York
cases, which are in the distinct minority, holding that an insurer must appeal on
behalf of his insured whenever there are reasonable grounds for appeal.7 In
their haste to reach the desired result, the court overlooked much precedent in
this area, and consequently its decision may have unexpected ramifications. To
place this case in perspective, this note will backtrack and examine the different
concepts and practicalities involved in imposing upon an insurer a duty to
appeal and construe the role of the new standard within this framework.
II. The Insurance Contract Provisions
There are three types of liability insurance contracts generally used which
concern the defense duty. Individual insurance companies may add or substract
a few terms at times or deviate from the model to suit their own needs, but these
three are the standard policies proposed by the insurance industry.' •The provision most commonly used before 1955 took this form: "As respects the insur4
5
6
7
8

Id. at 728.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 729-30.
Id. at 730-31.
All three standard policies appear inR.

IKETON,

supra note 1, at 481-82.
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ance afforded by the other terms of this policy under coverages A [Bodily Injury
Liability] and B [Property Damage Liability], the company shall [defend,
etc.].... ." This type of policy has often been found by courts to impose a defense
duty upon the insurer despite the tendering or exhaustion of policy limits.' In
an attempt to avoid this interpretation, the insurers began revising their policies
in 1955 to read as follows: 10
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily

injury liability and for property damage liability, the company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness,

disease or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such

suit is groundless, false or fraudulent....
Despite the high hopes that the insurance industry had concerning the 1955 revision, they were still left dissatisfied by the cases. Thus, in 1966 they offered
another type of revision which is the most current one to date. 1 This policy provision put the two duties, defense and indemnification, in the same paragraph
and added the following phrase: "but the company shall not be obligated to
pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements."
Because there is generally no express mention of a duty to appeal in insurance contracts, it is to one of these provisions that the courts must look in order
to impose this duty, if in fact there is one. In addition, the question of whether
the twin duties of indemnification and defense are separate or integrated will
effect to a large extent a court's determination of whether there is a duty to
appeal. Thus contract interpretation is essential. Public policy often dulls this
interpretation, however, and plays an important part in cases of this nature. To
date, the pre-1955 and the 1955 revision policies have been extensively litigated,
but the 1966 revision has yet to be definitively interpretated. All three policies
are still in existence, and the decisions to date offer insight into how the 1966
revision may be received by the courts.
III. The Duty to Defend vs. The Duty to Pay
The situation which must be examined in connection with this topic may be
summarized as follows: Suppose X, who is insured by Y company, is sued for a
tort, which is within policy coverage, by A and B. After an unsuccessful defense
or settlement for policy limits of A's action against X, the limits of the insurance
policy are exhausted. Now Y brings a declaratory judgment suit to determine
whether it must defend X in B's suit or, in the alternative, X sues Y after B's
suit for failure of Y to defend the second action. What results? The situation may
9 See American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Gir. 1951);
American Employer's Ins. Co.v. Goble Aircraft Sp., 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1954).
10 For the reasoning behind the 1955 revision see DesChamps, The Obligation of the
Insurerto Defend Under Casualty Insurance Policy Contracts, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 580 (1959).
11 See Atkins, Insurer's Obligation to Defend After Exhaustion of Policy Limits, 33 INs.
COUNSEL J. 250 (1966); Gavin, The Insurance Carriers Obligation to Defend When Claims
Against the Insured Exceed the Policy Limits, 35 INs. COUNSEL J. 92 (1968).
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also arise another way: Suppose X, again insured by Y company, is sued by A
and loses despite a defense by Y. Can Y automatically pay to the court its policy
limits and withdraw or must it appeal under some circumstances? The question,
then, is to what extent does the duty to pay control the duty to defend after the
insured has completed an adequate defense on the trial court level?12
There are two lines of reasoning concerning this question involving both the
pre-1955 and the 1955 revision policies. An example of an interpretation of a
pre-1955 policy holding that the duty to defend no longer exists after the policy
limits have been exhausted is Lumberan's Mutual Casualty Co. v.McCarthy.3
In that case the insurance company brought a declaratory judgment against its
insured in order to determine if it had a duty to defend a second action brought
against the insured after the policy limits had been exhausted in the first action.
The pertinent part of the contract read as follows: "the plaintiff agreed to defend
on behalf of the insured and in his name 'any suit, coming within the terms of
this Policy, seeking damages.., even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.' "i The court interpreted this provision to be subordinate to the duty to
indemnify, thus negating the duty to defend once payment occurred. It found
that the policy placed many duties upon both the insurer and insured but none
of these duties could survive indemnification.
As we construe the policy it obligates the insurer to pay the liability of the
insured up to the policy limits, and in addition thereto to pay those items of
expense which it has definitely assumed. Until these duties of payment are
fully performed, it also has the duty either to settle or to conduct the defense
of actions against the insured. But, upon performance of its duties of payment its duty to defend ceases to exist and the further defense of any
action pending thereafter must be conducted and may be controlled by the
insured.

5

A 1955 revision case holding the same way is Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Mead Corporation.' This was an action by an insured to recover costs and
attorney's fees for settling cases which were within policy coverage but were
ignored by the insurer since it had exhausted its policy limits in settling two prior
suits resulting from the same accident. The contract provisions which had to be
interpreted were identical to the 1955 revision policy cited in Part II of this
12 This note will not discuss the situation which results when an insurer refuses to defend
at all, whereby the insured claims an abrogation of the total defense duty and not just the
duty to appeal. Under these circumstances courts hesitate to find for the insurer because, if
the duty to defend is to have any meaning, insurers cannot be allowed to indemnify in lieu
of defending (or settling) on the trial court level. See Nat'l Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assur.
Co. of N. Y., 301 A.2d 222, 224 n.4 (D.C. 1973): "The court was careful to point out, however, that the insurer may not initially pay the policy limit and place the full burden on the
insured from the beginning... " See also Anchor Cas. Co.v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1949); Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 641 '(E.D. Pa. 1966); Natl Cas. Co. v. Ins. Co.
of North America, 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Sutton Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rolph, 109
N.H. 142, 244 A.2d 186 (1968); Grand Union Co. v. General Accident, Etc., Assur. Corp.,
254 App. Div. 274, 4 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1938). For a contrary view see Denham v. LaSalleMadison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948); Comm. Union Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Adams,
231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
13 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939).
14 Id. at 321, 8 A.2d at 751.
15 Id. at 323, 8 A.2d at 752.
16 219 Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534 (1963).
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article. This court, unlike the McCarthy court, was extremely meticulous in
analyzing the contract. It asked two questions:
Does "such insurance as is afforded by this policy" refer only to the several
types of liability coverage afforded by the policy ... ? Or does "such insurance as is afforded by this7 policy" refer to the types of coverages and the
amount of those coverages?1
The court felt that the policy limit on liability was too important to be ignored
in this context and thus that the duty to defend was necessarily limited by the
amount of liability coverage:
Insurance is composed not only of type of coverage, but also amount of coverage. To be insured only as to type of coverage is no protection at all.
Another dimension is involved, the amount of that coverage. 18

In American Employer's InsuranceCo. v. Goble Aircraft Specialities,Inc., 9
the interpretation of a pre-1955 policy was again in question but the answer
from this court was directly opposite that of the McCarthy and Mead courts.
Policy coverage for the insureds in this case contained a $300,000 limit, but
eleven actions were initiated against the insured seeking an aggregate recovery
of approximately one and one half million dollars. This action was an attempt
by the insurers to have the court declare that there was no duty to defend once
the $300,000 limit had been exhausted. The court denied the insurer's request.
They found the language in the contract imposing a duty to defend upon the
insurer to be "clear, positive and unambiguous" and not dependent upon the
amount of coverage. In support of their contention they cited the dissent in
McCarthy which had intimated that the defense duty should be construed for
the benefit of the insured and not the insurer. Furthermore, they tried to read
the contract as a layman would. In their view one reading the contract would
not suppose that all obligations terminated upon indemnification.
If plaintiff intended to reserve the right to withdraw counsel and cease to
defend such actions as might be pending after payment of the total amount
for which it indemnified, or to refuse to defend any new action commenced
after such payments, it was under a duty to so state in the policy which it
issued. The language required is such as would be clear
20 and comprehensible
to the average businessman without legal assistance.
In accord with the Goble line of thinking is Travelers Indemnity Company
v. East.2 ' This case involved the standard 1955 revision policy and a somewhat
different factual situation. The insurer had defended three insureds in the same
action and was successful in getting a directed verdict for two of them, but the
third party was held liable for a judgment in excess of the policy limits thus
17
18
19
20
21

Id. at 8, 131 S.E.2d at 535.
Id. at 9, 131 S.E.2d at 536.
205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1954).
Id. at 1073-74, 131 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
240 So. 2d 277 (Miss. 1970).
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exhausting the insurer's coverage. Subsequently, the two insureds who received
the directed verdict were forced to defend an appeal in that case which the
insurer claimed it now had no obligation to defend. The present suit was one
by these two insureds to recover attorney's fees expended in connection with that
appeal. The court began by recognizing that the 1955 revision was an attempt
to restrict the duty to defend but it declined to interpret the new contract as
opposed to the pre-1955 provisions. Instead it took notice of the two divergent
views in this area and chose to follow the view it felt was expressed in prior
Mississippi cases. The opinion placed great reliance on a pre-1955 case and it
admitted that the cases it was relying on as precedent were not on point factually.
Obviously groping for a way toimplement a public policy concern, the court
settled for arbitrarily declaring thiat "the appellant ... was required to defend
the insured under theterms of its policy although it had paid the full amount of
its money coverage "ahd is consequently liable for a reasonable attorney's fee
necessarily incurred in the appeal of the case."22
It appears from these four representative cases that there is an irreconcilable
conflict on this issue with regard to both the pre-1955 and 1955 revision
policies.2" Courts which hold that the duty to defend is subordinate to the duty
to pay have generally read the contract literally and strictly (a four-comers'
interpretation), while courts holding the opposing view feel compelled to implement a desired public policy. In accord with the latter line of reasoning is a
feeling that an ordinary man would, if he read the standard contracts, feel that
the insurer should defend him despite policy limit exhaustion. In addition,
these courts maintain that the insured pays for this total defense service as part
of his premium. The 1966 revision policy would not seem to resolve this conflict
either. Read literally, of course, this policy plainly reveals that the insurer has
no duty to defend a suit once policy limits are exhausted. This may not deter
courts like the one in East from imposing this duty upon insurers. Since insurance
companies are large corporate entities and since they write the terms of the contract and do not bargain for terms with the ordinary customer, a court could
easily find the 1966 revision policy to be an adhesion contract which is uncon2
scionable. Already one distinguished commentator has expressed such a view
In addition, courts like the Goble court, which specifically stated that if more
exact language had been inserted in the policy they might have found for the
insurer,25 may find that because consumerism has increased greatly in importance
during the past twenty years, public policy demands a result more in step with
the times. All of the foregoing points to the fact that the 1966 policy is not likely
to terminate the split of opinion. It is necessary, therefore, to determine how
both views affect the duty to appeal.
22 Id. at 280.
23 See also American Gas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 '(4th Gir. 1951),
in accord with Goble and Travelers Indem. Go. v. New England Box Co., 102 N.H. 380, 157
A.2d 765 (1960) following the McCarthy rationale despite a 1955 revision policy.
24 R. KEnTON, supra note 1, at 482: "This provision, like many others in the 1966 revision,
seems objectionable from policyholder and public interest points of view. It is likely that it
will receive unfriendly treatment at the hands of the courts."
25 205 Misc. at 1073, 131 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
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IV. The Duty to Appeal
As was mentioned in the Introduction, there are now two standards by
which to judge an insurer's duty to appeal an adverse decision rendered against
its insured: (1) the bad-faith standard and (2) the reasonable-grounds-for-appeal standard. Under the first standard an insurer will be held liable for not
appealing only if it has handled its defense duty (both trial court and failure to
appeal) or its negotiation of settlement offers in a grievously negligent or fraudulent manner. A statement summarizing this standard which courts are fond
of quoting is as follows:
A liability insurer, in determining whether to take an appeal from an
adverse judgment against the insured, must take into consideration not only
its own rights but the rights of others for which it is responsible; the insurer
becomes liable to such parties for refusal to take an appeal only if it acts
fraudulently or in bad faith.2 6
The insurer is charged with considering the rights of the insured under this
standard, but it is liable only when it seriously disregards those rights. On the
other hand, the reasonable grounds for appeal standard places a much more
affirmative duty upon the insurer. Whenever the trial court record or the facts
surrounding the case suggest a legitimate or feasible basis for appeal, the insurer
is obligated to appeal; and, if it refuses, the court has the luxury of determining
the reasonableness of its actions by hindsight. Only a reasonable probability of
success in the action need be shown, but failure or success on appeals actually
taken by the insured will affect the determination of reasonableness.
Before deciding which standard to apply, however, the courts will usually
consider the duty to pay versus the duty to defend controversy as a preliminary
question. Those courts holding that an insurer can negate the defense duty upon
indemnification will apply the bad-faith standard because they believe that the
insurer has the contractual right to terminate the contract upon indemnification
unless it has been grossly unfair to its insured. Once they reach the determination
that exhaustion of policy limits controls the duty to defend, it would be illogical
to hold that an appeal must be taken whenever there are reasonable grounds
for one. Obviously an obligation which is subservient to the main duty must
terminate when the main duty terminates unless there is some overriding concern,
here the lack of good faith, which is read into every contract. If they tried
to apply the reasonable-grounds standard, they would be allowing an insurer to
terminate the contract upon indemnification but then reimposing a contract
duty subsequent to termination. The reasonable-grounds standard, then, is applicable only to those cases which hold the duty to defend to be separate and distinct from the duty to pay. Under this interpretation, the insurer's contractual
obligation to defend can survive indemnification; thus there is no conflict between the two principles. So far, despite the split of authority on the duty to pay
versus the duty to defend question, there have been only two jurisdictions enforc26

44 Am. JUR. 2d Insurance § 1537 (1969).
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ing this second standard: New York and Kentucky (since Ursprung)." This
is not to say that the duty to appeal has been absent when the bad-faith standard has been applied. Both standards have produced decisions favorable to
the insured and cases in both areas must be discussed in order to get a complete
picture of the duty to appeal.
Courts applying the bad-faith standard have the task of determining which
actions by the insurer can be viewed as sufficiently detrimental to the insured
to occasion a realignment of contract duties. At times, however, the courts will
only take a cursory view of the facts and rely largely upon the indemnificationdefense rationale. One such case is General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin V.
Whipple.2" Here the court had already decided that there was no bad faith on
the part of the insurer in connection with the failure to settle issue; so when it
determined that policy limit exhaustion terminates the defense duty, it felt it had
answered the duty to appeal question.29 Obviously the court felt that lack of bad
faith in connection with one duty made it highly unlikely that there was bad
faith in connection with the other. The approach used by this court is one of
examining the entire insurer-insured relationship, not only the events connected
with the question of prosecuting an appeal. This approach was also used by the
court in Smoot v. State Farm Mfutual Automobile Ins. Co., ° but in a different
manner producing a different result. In reversing a summary judgment entered
against the insured, this court held that the failure to appeal may be valuable
evidence in the insured's case as proof of bad faith in the general handling of
the defense or in the insured's refusal to settle:
First, it [the failure to appeal] was a further illustration of bad management
and handling of the case demonstrating, so the Assured urged, that the Insurer acted both imprudently and in callous disregard of the Assured's
interests, hence in bad faith.3 1
In determining whether the insurer acted in bad faith, then, issues such as a
failure to settle may be intertwined with the characterization of the failure to
appeal.
A more particularized analysis of the bad faith standard, focusing on an
individual fact situation, appears in Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins.
Co. 2 The litigants in this suit were the primary and excess insurers. The excess
insurer, after having been forced to pay a judgment which exceeded the cover-"
age of the primary insurer because of the failure of the latter to prosecute an
appeal, sued to recover its contribution to the judgment. The question which
was central to the case was whether it was bad faith for the primary insurer to
27 Some jurisdictions have attempted to apply a standard somewhat stricter than the badfaith approach without using the reasonable grounds criteria. For an example, see Mannheimer
Bros. v. Kansas Cas. and Surety Co., 149 Minn. 482, 184 N.W. 189 (1921), where it was
suggested that the duty to defend incorporates a duty to appeal if necessary to vindicate the
rights of the insured.
28 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964).
29 Id. at 357-58.
30 299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1962).
31 Id. at 533.
32 260 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1958).
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refuse to appeal despite the recommendation of its counsel that an appeal would
be desirable. The court answered that the insurer had the right to make the
final decision on whether to prosecute on appeal, and thus not following counsel's
advice, was not in itself bad faith.
An attorney employed to defend litigation is, of course, in complete charge
... but the fact that he has authority to represent his client in the trial and
conduct the litigation gives him no right to prosecute on appeal. That is so
because his employment has come to an end. Of course, his recommendations with respect to an appeal are entitled to consideration, but whether an
appeal should be taken is a question for determination by the principal ...
the failure to take the advice of counsel employed to try a case, that an appeal should be taken, in itself, and without more, is insufficient to sustain a
finding of bad faith.33
Two other cases using a more specific analysis but finding for the insured

are Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co. 4 and Lincoln Park Arms Building Corp. v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 5 In Brassil the insured was able to prove
a bad faith failure to appeal despite a policy which was weighted heavily in the
insurer's favor. The contract gave the insurer the choice of either paying the
insured the policy limits and not providing any defense at all, settling the suit as
best it could, or defending the suit. The insurer chose to defend but was unsuccessful. A judgment resulted which was four times the policy limits, but it refused
to appeal in spite of this excess judgment. The court cited the following as proof
of bad faith in this refusal to appeal: (1) the failure of the insurer to settle
for the policy limits before the trial left the insured liable for the excess judg-

ment; (2) the insurer refused to indemnify the insured for the policy limits,
despite its refusal to appeal, until the insured had satisfied the entire judgment
against him-an acceptance of this offer would have destroyed any right which
the insured had to appeal; and (3) there was "a good ground of appeal." 6
All these elements added together led the court to the determination that the
insurer had left the insured in a perilous situation for which it was largely responsible. Thus, the court invoked the "implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing not expressed in the terms of its written contract,""7 in order to protect
the insured. Similarly, the Lincoln Park case involved an insurer's interference

with an insured's opportunity to appeal. The court found that the insurer acted
in bad faith when it failed to notify the insured that a judgment had been
rendered against it, that an appeal was possible, and that the insurer chose not
to appeal. 8 Ironically, the insurer had requested and had been granted leave
to appeal, but it never informed the insured of this. The court found this disregard for the insured's interests to be not only bad faith but also a breachi of the
duty to defend.
33

Id. at 363.

34 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
35 287 I1. App. 520, 5 N.E.2d 773 (1936). See also McAleenan v. Mass. Bonding & Ins.
Co.. 232 N.Y. 199, 133 N.E. 444 (1921).
36 210 N.Y. at 241, 104 N.E. at 624.
37 Id. at 242, 104 N.E. at 624.
38 287 Ill. App. at 538-39, 5 N.E.2d at 781.
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In analyzing the bad-faith standard, then, courts have chosen to look to the
overall relationship of the insurer and insured or to the effect of the insurer's
specific actions upon the insured. There has generally been no talk of intent to
deceive despite the lip service paid to fraudulent actions as an element of bad
faith; instead, the courts have characterized the insurer's actions as bad faith
when they felt equity and fair dealing demanded it.
In contrast to the bad-faith standard, courts using the reasonable grounds
for appeal approach must look ideally not to the actions of the insurer but to the
facts and substantive law of the case. This concept is so new that methods of
approach have not been established by the cases. An example of the reasoning
to date is the case which firmly rooted this approach into New York law, Kaste v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co." In this case the insured was suing for
the reasonable costs of an appeal which the insurer had refused to take and
which, as a result, the insured prosecuted on his own. Surprisingly enough this
court went directly to the main issue involved and ignored the duty to pay
versus duty to defend controversy. 0 Despite this neglect, the court unequivocally
held that "the covenant to defend embraces the duty to prosecute an appeal from
a judgment against an insured 'where there are reasonable grounds for appeal.' " 1 Furthermore, since the insured had taken an appeal on his own and
won, the court considered this conclusive proof that the appeal was reasonable.42
As a result, no standards were delineated by which to judge "reasonableness,"
nor was any analysis made of the fact situation. The New York cases following
Kaste have not had occasion to offer much assistance in this regard," and
Ursprung, the Kentucky case, followed Kaste boldly and blindly without analysis
of any sort. Some of the effects this standard will have and the questions it will
present to Kentucky and other jurisdictions adopting it are evident, and this
will be the topic of the next two sections.
V. Remedies and Proof of Damages Under Both Standards
An insured, faced with an insurer who refuses to appeal an excess judgment,
has three avenues of approach by which to remedy the situation: (1) he can
appeal on his own and, if he wins, sue the insurer for the costs of the appeal;
(2) he can appeal on his own and, if he loses, sue the insurer for the costs of
the appeal plus the amount of excess over the policy limits; or (3) he can let
39 5 App. Div. 2d 203, 170 N.Y.S.2d 614 "(1958).
40 The court did not relate enough facts for the reader to determine whether the
insurer claimed that indemnification negated the duty to defend. But it is possible, even if it
was an issue, that the court felt that Goble and Grand Union (see note 12, supra) had settled
the controversy in New York.
41 5 App. Div. 2d at 204, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
42 5 App. Div. 2d at 204-05, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 616:
The successful prosecution of the appeal is conceded in the respondent's answer. In
the light of the result of the appeal, it would seem that the issue relative to the presence of reasonable grounds for appeal has been determined.
Injury to the insured flowing from respondent's failure to prosecute the appeal
is demonstrated by the direction for a new trial consequent on the appeal prosecuted
by the insured.
43 See Fidelity General Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 932, 278 N.Y.S.2d
787 (1967); Home Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 737, 327 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1972);
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the time allowed within which an appeal must be perfected to pass and sue the
insurer immediately for the excess judgment.44 Under both the bad faith standard
and the reasonable grounds standard, alternative number one offers the insured
the best hope of success. The difference between the two standards, however, surfaces when one considers the weight to be given a victory by the insured when
he appeals on his own behalf. Brassil, a bad-faith case, refused to hold that the
obligation to defend necessarily encompasses a duty to appeal, but found the
insured's appeal victory to be an important element in the bad-faith formula. 5
The victory by itself would not have been enough to maintain the suit, however.
On the other hand, as evidenced by Kaste, the reasonable-grounds standard
makes such a victory on appeal conclusive proof that the insurer failed in its duty
to defend.46 It is logical that a bad-faith jurisdiction require a larger quantum
of proof in order to sustain the suit since the insurer, while exercising a good-faith
judgment, could still anticipate the risks and costs of an appeal, even with reasonable grounds, to be prohibitive.
If the insured loses an appeal, his chances of recovering under the bad-faith
standard diminish considerably. It is difficult to prove bad faith when an appellate court has denied the claim which the insured had wanted the insurer to
appeal. Furthermore, courts are hesitant to enter judgments for the excess
unless they can find that bad faith was in evidence throughout the entire trial.
The Hawkeye case offers this rationale:
In some of the cases finding liability for failure to take an appeal, the fact
that the appeal was successful was alluded to as a fact to take into consideration. While we do not feel that the result of an appeal has a bearing
on the question of good or bad faith, the result of this appeal tends to indicate that the Company's judgment as to47the possible result of an appeal
was sounder than was that of its attorney.
Under the reasonable-grounds standard, however, losing on appeal should not
affect the insured's claim against the insurer to such a great extent. Ideally, a
court applying this standard should realize that reasonable appeals do not always
prove successful. A case holding in favor of an insured and applying this logic is
Cornwell v. Safeco Insurance Ca. of America.4 8 Although the insured's appeal
was unsuccessful, the court found that the insurer's attorneys had been so negligent at the trial court that the insured's chances of winning on appeal were
greatly diminished. Thus the court felt that the insured's loss on appeal should
not adversely affect their decision of whether there were reasonable grounds for
appeal.
Since the appeal by Cornwell and Ross was lost not on the merits of their
44 The reasoning of the courts appears to follow the same lines when the insurer brings a
declaratory judgment suit seeking to establish that it need not appeal or need not pay the
costs of an appeal already taken by the insured.

In

this situation, the insured will usually

counterclaim for damages caused by the insured's failure to appeal and thus the insured will
be confronted with one of the alternatives heretofore set out.
45 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
46 See note 42, supra.
47 260 F.2d at 364.
48 42 App. Div. 2d 127, 346 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1973).
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substantive arguments but due to strategic and tactical errors made by trial
counsel as a result of his conflict of interests, for which they were not responsible, the court was correct in ruling that the expense of such appeal was
occasioned by Safeco's actions
and that Cornwell and Ross should have
49
recovery for their expenses.
The Cornwell court's approach to the reasonable-grounds standard, looking into
all aspects of the appeal before deciding reasonableness, negates some of the
stigma resulting from a loss on appeal; and, if followed in any other jurisdictions
applying this standard, would give great advantages to their insureds over the
bad-faith approach.
The third alternative, suing the insurer without taking an appeal at all, is
the least desirable from the insured's point of view under the bad-faith standard
since he has little upon which to base his proof of damages. In addition to being
uncertain about how the case would have gone on appeal, the insured also has
no expenses of appeal to claim.5" A few older cases have held that without an
appeal the insured cannot prove any damages because it is not known to what
extent he was injured, if at all.51 Also, with no appeal record before them, the
courts find it difficult to judge the soundness of the insured's denial to appeal
(an element in a determination of whether the insured acted in bad faith). Despite these impediments, though, the insureds in Lincoln Park were able to get
a judgment without appealing; but this case can be distinguished because it was
the bad-faith actions of the insurer which denied the insured the opportunity to
appeal.52 In general, the courts applying the bad-faith standard are reluctant
to render a judgment for the insured in this situation.
Although no cases have been decided which are directly on point, it can
be surmised that an insured choosing this third alternative would present a reasonable-grounds court with a dilemma. In theory, a court should be able to ascertain whether there were reasonable grounds for appeal without the benefit
of a record of an appeal actually taken. If reasonable grounds are found, it
would seem that the insured has a valid claim for any amount exceeding the
policy limits in the trial court judgment since not appealing when there are reasonable grounds is tantamount to a breach of the contract to defend. In addition,
a court in this situation, after determining that there were reasonable grounds
for appeal, would be hard put to hold that the damages were speculative since
reasonable grounds for appeal implies the probability of success on appeal. Thus
a favored escape route of the bad-faith courts disappears. Courts may find this
to be an inequitable result in light of the facts that the insured has taken no
action to vindicate his rights and that the insurer has not seriously prejudiced
him. A possible approach that courts might consider taking would be to require
a showing of bad faith in this situation and only apply the reasonable-grounds
49 Id. at -, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
50 See Gavin, supra note 11, at 108: "It should be noted that it is, as the Insureds in
Whipple discovered, more difficult to bring a claim against an insurance company when no
appeal has been taken and the expenses claimed are all speculative than where an actual appeal
has been taken by the insured on his own behalf."
51 Getchell & Martin Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Employers' L. Assur. Corp., 117 Iowa 180,
90 N.W. 616 (1902); Sterios v. Southern Surety Co., 122 Wash. 36, 209 P. 1107 (1922).
52 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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standard when the insurer has taken action on his own. In effect, the insurer
would benefit by a presumption of fair dealing when the insured refuses to act
responsibly. Until some cases are forthcoming, however, the practical effect of
the reasonable-grounds standard upon this situation remains uncertain.
A fourth alternative, not previously mentioned because its effect would be to
render the same result in both bad-faith and reasonable-grounds jurisdictions as
far as the insured is concerned, is an assignment of the cause of action for the
failure to appeal by the insured to the trial court plaintiff in satisfaction of the
excess judgment. Such a tactic would not prevent the courts from hearing the
questions discussed previously since the assignee will now present them, but it
can be a valuable tool for negating any injury to the insured caused by the failure
to appeal. In Ursprung, Clark's lawyer-friend effectively employed this device
and saved Clark the burden of a costly suit against the insurer.' s Furthermore,
despite protestations of the insurers, there is precedent for this device among
cases allowing assignment of a cause of action for the failure of an insurer to
defend at all.5 4
[A]fter a loss has occurred and rights under the policy have accrued, an
assignment may be made without the consent of the insurer, even though
the policy prohibits assignments. Under such circumstances, the assignment
of a right under the policy is not regarded as a transfer of the policy itself,
but rather of a chose in action. 55
Some courts have gone so far as to allow prejudgment assignments coupled with
covenants not to execute upon judgment to stand as long as no evidence of collusion is shown.56 Analogously, the assignment of a cause of action for the failure
to appeal should not present any problem in enforcement.
There are two factors which might make a victorious plaintiff unwilling to
accept such an assignment. The first is exemplified in Ursprung. When Clark's
lawyer-friend told the insurer that there was no need to appeal because he had
other means to protect his client, he effectively destroyed the possibility of the
assignee recovering from the insurer. Despite the Kentucky court's willingness to
accept standards more favorable to the insured's assignee, the court was forced
to consider the lawyer's actions to be a release from the duty to appeal. 57 Secondly, since assignment would be effected in lieu of an appeal, the assignee would
have the worst chance of succeeding under both standards (alternative number
three). The possibility of an inadvertent release and the difficulty of proving
damages, then, may deny an insured this alternative; but if there is a real probability that the entire judgment would be overturned if the insured appealed, as
in Ursprung, it may still be the least costly and most efficacious route for both
the plaintiff and the insured.
The insured, then, has several possibilities for obtaining a remedy when
confronted with an insurer who refuses to appeal. His best opportunity for succeeding, under both standards, comes when he appeals on his own and either
53 497 S.W.2d at 727.
54 See Communale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
55 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4269, at 70 (1962).
56

57

Damron v. Sledge, 105 Ariz. 151, 460 P.2d 997 (1969).
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has the judgment reversed or reduced to within policy limits. Despite this one
similarity between the standards, though, an insured gains considerable advantages when the court applies the reasonable-grounds criterion: his burden of
proving a breach of contract and damages is reduced, and he benefits from a
conclusive presumption of reasonableness whenever he wins on appeal. The
essential difference between the standards in this regard, the difference which
benefits the insured, is revealed when one looks at the nature of the two standards: the bad-faith standard imposes liability upon the insurer only after proof
that he has not done something, i.e., act in good faith, while the reasonablegrounds standard imposes this same liability upon the insurer if facts exist which
make its action mandatory. It is the difference between negative proof (proof
that he did not do something) and affirmative proof (proof that he should have
done something), and this difference is vitally important.
VI. Conclusion:

Old Problems and New Standards

A court applying this new standard may be plagued by an argument which
has been advanced whenever courts have been asked to impose a duty to defend:
(1) after the policy limits have been exhausted or (2) when it is uncertain
whether the injury alleged falls within policy coverage. Insurers confronted with
one of these situations often claim that causing an insurer to control litigation
after it no longer has an interest in the outcome is unsound and may be an unlawful exercise of the corporate practice of law.5" This argument has been refuted by Professor Keeton 9 and other commentators, and it has been suggested
that, at the very least, insurers could be required to pay for the services of independent attorneys if they felt themselves too disinterested. ° Perhaps the best
response to the insurance company's position is found in Mead Corp. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.:61

The argument that the insurance company has no further pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the litigation because it has paid out the policy limits is
erroneous, because it is also obligated to fulfill its other obligations for which
it received a premium payment.... To contend that it would not be to
the best interests of the insured to leave his defense to the insurance company
and counsel chosen by it after the company had ceased to have a pecuniary
interest in the indemnity aspects of the case, and that such a defense might
in that event be carelessly or frivolously handled, would be a reflection on
the insurance industry and the counsel who represent them. Attorneys,
whether or not paid by insurance companies, owe their primary obligation
to the insured they are employed to defend, and the insurance company likewise owes to its insured the duty to provide competent investigative and
legal representation. In furnishing this, the insurance company is not itself
"practicing law" . . t2
58 See Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489 (1963) upholding
this argument. See aist, Des Champs, supra note 10, at 583.
59 R. KEnToN, supra note 1, at 480.
60 Gavin, supra note 11, at 110.
61 107 Ga. App. 167, 129 S.E.2d 162 (1962).
62 Id. at 171, 129 S.E.2d at 165. This case was reversed by the Supreme Court of Georgia
(see text accompanying notes 16, 17 & 18, supra) but that court made no mention of the
corporate practice of law question.
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Another problem may surface if the insured prosecutes an appeal on his
own behalf without checking to ascertain the insurer's position with respect to
continuing the defense of the action. In most liability insurance contracts the
duty to defend incorporates the notion that the insurer has complete control
of the defense at all times.63 Thus an insured who prosecutes an appeal or files
an appeal and then settles before the appellate court's decision may be charged
with breach of contract. This problem is familiar in cases involving settlement
issues, and it could frustrate an insured's remedy in this situation as well. It is
best, then, as the insured in Ursprung did, to wait for notice from the insurance
company before filing an appeal or seeking a postjudgment settlement."
If an insured can avoid these two problems, any court should be able to
see its way clear to enforcing a reasonable-grounds standard. In this age of increasing judgments, this may be a method for courts to implement a desired
public policy, i.e., exposing insureds to as few excess judgments as possible by
requiring the insurer to exercise reasonable care in protecting the interests of its
insureds at all times. In addition, it may provide the insured with a service he
thought he was paying for all along-a complete defense. The 1966 revision
may hold the key to the future of this area since if interpreted literally it could
force a perpetuation of the bad-faith standard. The meaning of bad faith could
be expanded by some courts, of course, to incorporate some of the elements of
the reasonable-grounds standard and this may be a sufficient compromise protecting both insurer and insured. With the recent resurgence of interest in consumer affairs, though, the reasonable-grounds standard would seem to be the
standard for the future. Insurers should recognize that a more expansive definition of the duty to defend, despite the 1966 revision, may be just around the
comer. "It may be safer for the Co. to carry an excess judgment on to a final
appeal, thus establishing that everything possible was done to protect the interests of the insured.""5
Raymond M. Planell

63

R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 483.

65

Gowan, Provisions of Automobile and Liability Insurance Contracts, 30 INS. COUNSEL

64

497 S.W.2d at 727.

J. 96, 98 (1963).

